Just a war but a just war (Part 1)
 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was fought from October 6 to October 26, 1973 by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria, to regain the occupied lands of Sinai and Golan Heights which Israel have unrightfully invaded during the Six-Day War of 1967, known nationally as an‑Naksah
(The Setback).
In the years following 1967 war, Israel erected lines of fortification in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971 Israel spent $500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, with a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named after Israeli General Chaim Bar-Lev.
The 1973 war began with a surprise joint attack by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur; the Jewish feast day of atonement. The Egyptians and Syrians advanced during the first 24–48 hours, after which momentum began to waver. By the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed out of the Golan Heights. In the Sinai, the Israeli forces made a final push, struck at the seam between the two attacking Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal, and cut off the Egyptian Third Army in what is known nationally as al-thaghrah, just before a United Nations cease-fire came into effect.
This war was not an effort of one president or administration, it was a national effort and commitment that took 6 years in preparations and planning.
During the Six-Day War of 1967, the Israelis captured Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula all the way up to the Suez Canal, which had become the cease-fire line, and roughly half of Syria’s Golan Heights. Egypt and Syria both desired a return of the land lost in the Six-Day War. And back then, negotiating with Israel was not even an imaginary option, the Khartoum Arab Summit issued the famous “3 No’s”: “no recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel.”
President Gamal Abd el Nasser died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, and both were resolved to fight Israel and win back the territory lost in the
Six-Day War.
While Nasser’s policy was to take back by force what Israel took by force, Sadat hoped that by inflicting a medium or even a limited defeat on the Israelis, the status quo could be altered and peace negotiations would start. In 1971, and on numerous occasions Sadat, declared that if Israel committed itself to “withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip” and to implementation of other provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242, Egypt would then “be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel.” These peace invitations went unanswered.
Yet Sadat knew that no negotiations could or should take place before a war. Moreover, he also felt that the great shame and demoralization over the Six-Day War, and the illusion of the supreme invincible formidable Israeli army, had to be shattered before any national reforms could be introduced. Anwar Sadat publicly stated on many occasions that Egypt was committed to going to war with Israel, and that they were prepared to
“sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers.”
Hafiz al-Assad, the President of Syria, had a different view. He was committed to the same views and policies of Gamal Abd el Nasser; he had little interest in negotiation and felt that retaking the Golan Heights should be a purely military operation.
The other Arab states, on both the frontlines and rear lines, showed much more reluctance in fully committing to a new war.
King Hussein of Jordan feared another major loss of territory, Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom. Hussein knew that Sadat was backing the claim of the PLO to the occupied territories (West Bank and Gaza) and in the event of a victory Sadat would give Yasser Arafat control of occupied Palestinian territory. Moreover, during the Black September crisis of 1970, the near civil war had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government – in which the Palestinian death toll in 11 days of fighting was estimated at 4,000 to 8,000 deaths- Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO, estranging Assad and Hussein. Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, and the Iraqis refused to join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel, was not expected to join the Arab war effort due to its small army and already evident instability.
Since the Six-Day War, and all through the War of Attrition, Egypt put all its effort into rebuilding its armory and tactics. In 1972 Saddat concentrated into gearing up the Egyptian armies, with MiG-21 jet fighters, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-6 and SA-7 antiaircraft missiles, T-55 and T-62 tanks, RPG-7 antitank weapons, and the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet Union.
 But faced by the constant lagging and bureaucracy of the Soviets - Russia sought to maintain the status quo so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with USA - it became imperative to expel the Soviets from Egypt. In July 1972, Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisers in the country and reoriented the country’s foreign policy to be more favorable to the United States.
The months before the war saw Sadat engage in a successful diplomatic campaign to win support for the war. By the fall of 1973, he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states, including Britain and France whom for the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel on the United Nations Security Council.
Surprise! Surprise!
The Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that if war was imminent, Israel, armed by information from its intelligence service, launches a pre-emptive strike to destroy the attacking armies before they attack, as to avoid direct confrontation and open war.
That is why the October war was Planned in absolute secrecy - even the upper-echelon commanders were not told of war plans until less than a week prior to the attack, and the soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand. The plan to was code-named Operation Badr (the Arabic word for “full moon”), after the Islamic victory of Badr.
The IDF’s Directorate of Military Intelligence’s
(abbreviated as “ AMAN “) assessments on the likelihood of war were based on several sources. AMAN assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt went to war as well. AMAN predicted war with Egypt was not imminent, because Egypt haven’t acquired the MiG-23 fighters and Scud missiles, that Egypt need for the war. This assumption about Egypt’s strategic plans, known as “the concept”, strongly prejudiced the department’s thinking and led it to dismiss other war warnings.
The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of false information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the advanced equipment.
Sadat had so long engaged in brinkmanship, that his frequent war threats were being ignored by the world. In May and To be continued…
August 1973 the Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border and mobilizing in response both times had cost the Israeli army some $10 million.
For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a weeklong training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed these movements as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were puzzling, but not a threat because, as AMAN believed, Syrians would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the weaponry they wanted arrived.
The obvious reason for choosing the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur for staging a surprise attack on Israel was that on this specific day the country comes to a complete standstill. Many soldiers leave military facilities for home during the holiday and Israel is most vulnerable, especially with much of its army demobilized.
What not a lot of people know though is that, according to Abraham Rabinovich a chief Jewish historian, on the night of September 25, King Hussein of Jordon secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending Syrian attack. Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears. AMAN concluded that the king had not told her anything she did not already know.
Despite the Egyptian secrecy, Israel still received many warnings of the war, but Mossad chief Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein’s warnings succeeded in stirring his doubts. Zamir would later remark, “We simply didn’t feel they were capable of War”.
To be continued…
Mohamed Radwan |
